The president of the Catalonian regional government Artur Mas leaves
after a parliament session on Sept. 27, 2012 in Barcelona. It has been
a week of upheavals in Spain, with police violence against protestors
surrounding the parliament building in Madrid, new doubts about a
planned bank bailout, and the release of a national budget that
requires more painful cuts in the coming year. But perhaps none of the
events of the past few days has raised greater questions about Spain's
future than those occurring in Catalonia.
On Tuesday, regional president Artur Mas called for early regional
elections in an effort to gauge support for the pro-independence
platform it was newly adopting. Two days later, the Catalan parliament
went further, approving a resolution to hold a non-binding referendum
on secession once the new legislature is installed. Yet for all the
momentum—momentum that comes on the heels of a massive
pro-independence demonstration in Barcelona two weeks ago—no one here
really knows if secession is even possible.
"The voice of the street must be expressed at the polls," Mas told the
Catalan parliament on Wednesday. Explaining the snap elections as an
inevitable reaction to a secessionist march that had drawn an
estimated 1.5 million people into the streets of Barcelona, he
signaled a new ideological direction for his party, Convergència I
Unió [CiU)]. "The time has come," he said, "for Catalonia to exercise
its right to self-determination."
Not everyone sees it that way. For Alicia Sánchez-Camacho, head of the
Catalan Popular Party, the bid for independence is making a bad
situation worse. "To call snap elections, when we're not even halfway
through the legislative term is irresponsible and proof of Mas'
failure to govern," she says. "And by pushing for independence, he's
taking the economic crisis and adding an institutional one to it,
which will only generate instability and uncertainty."
It is also not at all clear that separation is a real option. Apart
from the questions about economic viability (everything from loss of
investments to membership in the European Union), there are also
serious doubts about how and whether Catalonia could legitimately
establish itself as an independent state. "There's no chance," says
Enrique Alvaro, professor of constitutional law at Madrid's University
of King Juan Carlos. "The Spanish constitution doesn't permit
secession. You'd have to reform the constitution, and both of the
major parties have made it clear they aren't willing to do that." Even
if they were, reforming the constitution is an onerous process that
requires, among other things, a 2/3 majority in the national
legislature, the dissolution of the sitting parliament, and new
elections.
Even those with doubts about the viability of secession agree,
however, that a consultation of the sort that the Catalonian
parliament approved on Thursday would be a critical first step. "You
have to answer the big question: What percentage of Catalans really
want to separate from Spain?" says Francesc de Carreras, professor of
constitutional law at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. "We have
have to clear that up. And the only way to do that is by voting."
Yet even that is tricky. In 2008, Basque leader Juan José Ibarretxe
tried to call for a similar non-binding "consultation" in his region,
only to have the proposal shot down by the Spanish government as
unconstitutional. And already, deputy prime minister Soraya Sáenz de
Santamaria has vowed that the government will use its "juridical and
judicial instruments to stop" a Catalan attempt to do the same.
But the Catalan parliament is hardly backing down. "If we can do it
through a referendum authorized by the Spanish government, good," Mas
said in a speech before his fellow legislators. "But if the government
turns its back and doesn't authorize any time of referendum or
consultation, well, we'll have to do it just the same."
Some constitutional law experts think that Catalonia could pull it off
by looking outside Spain. "You would have to do a good job of winning
international support," says Ferran Requejo, political scientist at
Barcelona's Pompeu Fabra university. "Secession is completely illegal
in Spain, so you'd have to look for legitimacy outside."
Few countries, however, are going to support a unilateral declaration
of independence, especially those—like Great Britain and the
Canada—that have secessionist issues of their own. And Catalonia may
face other challenges in arousing international sympathies. "We're not
talking about Kosovo or Southern Sudan," says José Ignacio
Torreblanca, professor of political science at Spain's National
Distance University. "With autonomy as great as it is in Catalonia,
it's very difficult to make the case that you're a victim, that its
worth jumping over the Spanish constitution so you can liberate
yourself."
The pro-independence parties are banking on the idea that a
referendum—even a non-binding one—could shift that balance, winning
support for negotiation both at home and abroad. If there were a
significant turnout and an overwhelming majority—not 51% but something
more like 70%–voted in favor of independence, Catalonia might find
itself in a position to pressure Madrid into negotiating a revision of
the constitution that would allow for legal separation or, at the very
least, a more federal state. "Democratically, Catalonia has to prove
that a clear majority of its citizens are in favor of independence,"
says De Carreras. "And if they do that, then, democratically, Spain is
going to find it very difficult to say, "Ok, even though you're the
majority, we're going to ignore you.'"
Apart from the legalities of secession, the impetus behind the move to
separate may depend on Mas' motives. Catalonia recently requested a 5
billion euro bailout from the state, and has been forced to make
drastic cuts in public services. "They've the highest public debt in
the country, and are making cuts as severe or worse as those in the
rest of Spain," says Alvaro. "I don't think there's any doubt that he
[Mas] is pushing separatism as of way of distracting people from the
economic situation."
Indeed, Mas and his party are recent converts to the secessionist
cause. Although nationalist, the CiU historically has confined
itself—like the majority of Catalans—to supporting greater autonomy
rather than outright independence. If that has changed for both the
party and the population at large (recent polls say that 51% of
Catalans now support secession), it is partly due to the economic
crisis. "Many Catalans have constructed this idea that the cause of
the crisis is with the rest of Spain," says Torreblanca. "They figure
if you get rid of the cause you solve the problem."
The region is the most indebted in the country, but many Catalans
blame the debt on what they call "fiscal looting," a reference to the
disproportionate amount of taxes they pay to the state, compared with
other regions. Last week, Mas tried to wrangle a new fiscal pact from
the Spanish government that would give Catalans control over tax
collection. When prime minister Mariano Rajoy refused to negotiate,
Mas said he had no choice but to embrace secession. "Fiscal reform was
CiU's main platform," says Requejo. "Once that was rejected, Mas had
to legitimize his party. When you combine that with the massive
demonstration [on September 11], it's logical that he would turn to
independence."
Read more: http://world.time.com/2012/09/28/why-catalonia-isnt-likely-to-leave-spain-anytime-soon/#ixzz27oANS9L7
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